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Code Sections Affected
Penal Code § 1376 (new).
SB 3 (Burton); 2003 STAT. Ch. 700.
I. INTRODUCTION
On a June day in 2002, Luis Gomez sat in an Imperial County courtroom as
jury selection began in the trial against him for the 1998 stabbing death of a
fellow inmate.2 Gomez faced the death penalty for "an assault likely to cause
great bodily harm by a prisoner serving a life sentence. 3 The very same day, the
U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Atkins v. Virginia holding that the
execution of mentally retarded persons is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Mr. Gomez's attorneys claimed he has an intelligence quotient ("IQ") of 70,
and therefore he may be in the group of defendants for whom execution would
not be permitted under Atkins.5 However, the Atkins decision provided no precise
rules for determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, but instead left to,
each of the states the task of defining mental retardation and establishing
procedures for making that determination.6 But because legislation that would
have given the Gomez court direction failed passage,7 the judge was left to
"craft[] his own procedure. '
At the conclusion of the trial in which Gomez was found guilty, the court
ordered an intermediate hearing before the jury to determine whether he was
mentally retarded.9 That jury concluded Gomez was not mentally retarded but
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.' ° Similarly, a
1. Margaret Talbot, The Executioner's I.Q. Test, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 29, 2003.
2. Claude Walbert, Rules to Die By: In the Absence of State Law Governing the Execution of Retarded
Convicts, an Imperial County Judge Has Taken the Initiative, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 21, 2002, at 1.
3. Id. (referencing California Penal Code section 4500).
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
5. Walbert, supra note 2, at 1; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5 (noting that "between [one] and
[three] percent of the population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is typically considered the cutoff
IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition).
6. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; see also SENATE COMMIrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
SB 3, at 6-7 (Feb. 11, 2003) (including the author's statement on the need for the bill).
7. AB 557 (2001) (as amended on Aug. 12, 2002, but not enacted).
8. Walbert, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Jeffrey Anderson, Judge Will Determine if Defendant Is Retarded, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 19, 2002, at 3.
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court in Riverside County ordered a jury hearing prior to sentencing for a
defendant on trial for killing a police officer in 2001."
By contrast, in a Tulare County case in which Efrain Hernandez was tried for
his alleged participation "in a drive-by shooting for the benefit of a criminal
gang," the court ordered a pretrial bench hearing to consider Hernandez's claim
that he was mentally retarded. 12 The conflicting procedures in Riverside, Imperial
and Tulare counties resulted from the absence of legislation implementing the
Atkins decision. 3 According to one expert, conflicting practices such as these can
only worsen the lengthy periods of time involved in enforcing California's death
penalty laws. 4
Chapter 700 was enacted in response to the Atkins decision and in order to
ensure consistent procedures for determining whether a defendant is mentally
retarded." The new law establishes uniform procedures relating to the timing of
the mental retardation determination and to resolves questions about how to
precisely define mental retardation and which party has the burden of going
forward and of proving the claim.
6
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE MANDATE OF ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
A. Executing Mentally Retarded Persons Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, any criminal sanction
that is excessive, or any punishment that is "cruel and unusual," is prohibited."'
Whether a punishment is excessive or cruel and unusual is judged by currently
prevailing standards of decency.'" In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court was first
presented with the question of whether executing the mentally retarded is
constitutionally permissible in Penry v. Lynaugh.'9 In Penry, the Court upheld
executions of the mentally retarded concluding that "[t]he clearest and most
11. Id.
12. See id. (reporting on Assistant Presiding Judge Paul Vortmann's ruling that "the court has no
jurisdiction to try Efrain Hernandez on capital charges until his eligibility for the death penalty has been
determined").
13. See The Atkins Debate, CAPrrAL CONNECTION (Jud. Council of Cal., Admin. Off. of the Cts.,
Sacramento), Jan. 2003, at 3 (quoting Larry Brown, Executive Director, California District Attorneys Association,
on the need for a law to implement the Atkins decision).
14. Id.
15. See Letter from John L. Burton, Senate President pro Tempore and author of Chapter 700, to Members
of the California Assembly (Aug. 27, 2003) (requesting support for the legislation enacting Chapter 700 and
discussing the need for the legislation) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
16. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 3, at 5-6 (Feb. 11, 2003)
(describing the provisions of Chapter 700).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIE, § 1 (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted").
18. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311-12 (2002).
19. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2004 / Penal
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by
the country's legislatures." 20 At that time, only sixteen states and the federal
government prohibited those executions or prohibited executions entirely. 2' As a
result, the Court held that there was not enough evidence to conclude that a national
consensus had emerged against the execution of the mentally retarded 2
In the fifteen years following the Court's holding in Penry, sixteen states
have enacted legislation to exempt the mentally retarded from execution.23 The
Atkins Court also pointed out that it is significant that states have acted to
prohibit executing the mentally retarded at a time when anti-crime legislation is
far more popular than "providing protections for persons guilty of violent
crimes. 24 In addition, even in those states that allow mentally retarded persons to
be executed, the Court pointed out that such executions are rare.25 The Court then
concluded that "it is fair to say that a national consensus" against putting a
retarded person to death had emerged. 6 Despite the apparent consensus that has
developed against executing mentally retarded persons convicted of murder,
however, the Court pointed out that no consensus has emerged on which
offenders are in fact retarded.27 Therefore, the Court left to the states "'the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction[s]"' set forth
in the decision, including determining which defendants would meet the criteria
for mental retardation.28
B. Mental Retardation Defined
While the Atkins decision did not provide a precise definition of mental
retardation, the Court noted that statutory definitions generally conform to the
clinical definitions developed by the American Association on Mental Retardation
("AAMR").29 In 1983, 1992 and 2002, the AAMR developed and refined three
versions of a mental retardation definition." Although there were three versions,
20. Id. at 331.
21. Cynthia Han, "Evolving Standards of Decency": Legislative and Judicial Developments Leading to
Atkins v. Virginia, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 469,470 (2002).
22. Id.
23. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 (indicating that Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Washington, all enacted laws prohibiting executions of mentally retarded offenders).




28. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,416-17 (1986)).
29. Id. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22.
30. In 1983, the AAMR defined mental retardation as follows: "Mental retardation refers to significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period." James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A
Guide to State Legislative Issues, 5-6 (n.d.) (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICtENCY,
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there are elements common to all three definitions: (1) substantial intellectual
impairment; (2) inability to adapt to everyday life; and (3) manifestation of the
disability prior to adulthood.3' Under the first prong-general intellectual
functioning-a mentally retarded person must be impaired to the extent that it places
that person in the bottom two percent of the general population as measured by
performance on a standard intelligence test.12 The Court in Atkins noted that an IQ
score of between seventy and seventy-five is "typically considered the cutoff IQ
score for the intellectual functioning prong... ."" However, a majority of state
statutes do not include a numerical benchmark and instead follow the more general
definition of the AAMR.
3 4
The second prong of the mental retardation definition requires that the
defendant's intellectual impairment exist concurrently with deficits in adaptive
behavior.35 Thus, the intellectual impairment must result in "real-world" disabilities
in that person's life activities.36 The Court in Atkins explained how the merger of the
first and second prongs of the mental retardation definition relates to criminal
culpability:
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive
skills.... Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 8th ed. 1983)). The 1992 definition,
cited in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, is as follows:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations
in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION,
AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 9th ed. 1992).
The 2002 AAMR definition is as follows: "Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and
practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18." American Association on Mental Retardation,
Definition of Mental Retardation (2002), available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq-mentalretardation.
shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
31. Ellis, supra note 30, at 5 (unpublished document on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. See id. at 7 (discussing the limited intellectual functioning prong of the mental retardation
diagnosis).
33. 536 U.S. at 309 n.5.
34. Brief of Amici Curiae American Association on Mental Retardation et al. at app. 8a, McCarver v.
North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001). Those states that have specified a particular IQ score in their definitions
have not been able to avoid administrative difficulties. See Ellis, supra note 30, at 7 (noting that those state
statutes that specify an IQ score "prove difficult to administer" because "it is simply impossible to exclude
consideration of other factors about the testing performed on the individual, nor is it possible to ignore the need
for clinical judgment by experienced diagnosticians").
35. See supra note 30 (detailing the several mental retardation definitions of the AAMR, which all
provide that deficits in intellectual functioning exist "concurrently" with deficits in adaptive skills).
36. Ellis, supra note 30, at 8.
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their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others.... Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.7
The third and final element of the generally accepted definitions of mental
retardation is that the disability be manifest during the developmental period." At
the time the Atkins decision was announced, both the AAMR and the American
Psychiatric Association identified the age cutoff as eighteen.39 According to the
Court, "The purpose of this prong of the definition is to distinguish mental
retardation from those forms of... brain damage that may occur later in life...
such as traumatic head injury, dementia caused by disease, or similar
conditions." This final prong also helps "to ensure that defendants [cannot]
feign mental retardation [after they are] charged with a capital offense.'"'
Therefore, the disability must manifest prior to adulthood.
Prior to Chapter 700, the existing statutory definition of mental retardation
applied only to cases in which a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor offense
was adjudged to be mentally retarded and, therefore, diverted from incarceration
into habilitation or rehabilitation. 2 While this definition had not been applied
specifically in capital litigation by statute,43 the definition is identical to the 1983
AAMR definition used in a majority of state statutes that prohibit the execution
of the mentally retarded.' Both definitions refer to significant subaverage
intellectual functioning manifest prior to adulthood, concurrent with adaptive
limitations, and neither definition refers to a specific IQ score.45
III. CHAPTER 700
Chapter 700 provides that mentally retarded "means the condition of
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
37. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (footnote omitted).
38. Ellis, supra note 30, at 9.
39. 536 U.S. at 309 n.3.
40. Ellis, supra note 30, at 9 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 10.
42. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001.20-1001.34 (West 2003) (defining "mentally retarded" and
establishing procedures for determining whether a misdemeanant is retarded and, therefore, eligible for
diversion).
43. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 3, at 8-9 (Feb. 11, 2003).
44. See supra note 30 (discussing the 1983 AAMR definition of mental retardation).
45. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.20 (defining "mentally retarded"); supra note 30 (quoting the 1983
definition of mental retardation in its entirety).
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deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of eighteen.4 6
Chapter 700 also provides that, in capital cases, after reasonable notice and prior
to the trial on the defendant's guilt, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine
whether the defendant is mentally retarded. 7 In order to establish the need for
such a hearing, the defendant must submit a qualified expert's declaration stating
his or her opinion that the defendant is mentally retarded.4' The defendant's
request for a court hearing on mental retardation prior to trial is deemed to waive
a jury hearing on the issue of mental retardation.49 If the defendant does not
request that the hearing be conducted prior to trial, the court shall order that a
jury hearing be conducted after the trial on guilt but before the defendant is
sentenced. 0
After meeting the burden of going forward, the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she is mentally retarded. If the court
finds that the defendant is mentally retarded, Chapter 700 provides that the trial
shall "proceed as in any other case in which a sentence of death is not sought by
the prosecution.""2 If the defendant is then found guilty of murder in the first
degree with a finding of special circumstance, Chapter 700 requires the court to
sentence the defendant to life without the possibility of parole. 3 If the court or
jury does not find that the defendant is mentally retarded, the trial "shall proceed
as in any other case in which a sentence of death is sought by the prosecution."'
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 700
A. Definition of Mental Retardation
The definition of mental retardation in Chapter 700 follows the AAMR
definitions and does not set a specific numerical IQ score to determine whether a
defendant is mentally retarded.55 The absence of a specific IQ score for determining
mental retardation has not created difficulties in distinguishing meritorious
claims from non-meritorious claims, particularly in those states following a
version of the AAMR definition. 6 Nevertheless, opponents of Chapter 700 were
initially concerned that, in leaving out a specific numerical benchmark, the
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (enacted by Chapter 700).
47. Id. § 1376(b)(1)-(2); see also id. § 190.2 (enumerating the special circumstances of a crime that
warrant the imposition of the death penalty or, alternatively, life in prison without the possibility of parole).
48. Id. § 1376(b)(1).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 1376(b)(3).
52. Id. § 1376(c)(1).
53. Id.
54. Id. §§ 1376(c)(2), 1376(d)(2).
55. Id. § 1376(a); supra note 30 (detailing the several AAMR definitions of mental retardation).
56. Ellis, supra note 30, at 8.
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definition would be overly broad, would ignore benchmarks used by experts, and
would lead to some "death penalty defendants... attempting to improperly gain
advantage under Atkins. 57 Proponents pointed out that the intellectual
functioning prong is not the sole determination of retardation and must be
considered in light of the impact of such functioning on present adaptive ability.58
Further, because Chapter 700 requires that the impairment be manifest during the
developmental period, "any concerns that an individual could somehow manage
to feign cognitive impairment, undetected by clinical evaluators, should be
dispelled by the fact that such deception would have had to begin during the
individual's childhood."5 9 Therefore, it is unlikely that Chapter 700's exclusion of
an IQ benchmark will make it difficult to distinguish those with mental
retardation from those who are not so impaired.
B. Procedures for Determining Mental Retardation
Chapter 700 permits the defendant to raise the issue of mental retardation "at
a reasonable time prior to commencement of trial. . . ."60 Perhaps one of the more
difficult issues to resolve, 6t opponents heavily criticized the provisions allowing
for a pre-trial determination of mental retardation but the author and the chief
62proponents viewed those provisions as essential. A pre-trial determination of
mental retardation seeks to avoid the jury being unduly influenced by facts of the
underlying crime that, according to some, are irrelevant to the mental retardation
57. See Letter from David LaBahn, Executive Director, California District Attorneys Association, to
Senator John L. Burton, Cal. State Senate (June 17, 2003) [hereinafter LaBahn Letter] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Chapter 700 "fails to specify an IQ number as the threshold for
determining retardation, despite the fact that the [American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders IV] used by experts specifies an IQ of 70 or below").
58. See Virginia Nolton, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Testimony before the Assembly Committee on
Public Safety (July 2, 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the advantages of the
definition used in Chapter 700).
59. Ellis, supra note 30, at 10.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 700).
61. See Hudson Sangree, Defense Bar Cedes Ground in 'Atkins' Bill on Executions, S.F. DAILY J., July
2, 2003, at 1, 7 (describing the issue of when the mental retardation determination is made as a "major sticking
point").
62. See, e.g., Letter from Les Kleinberg, Legislative Advocate for Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of
California, to John Burton, President pro Tempore, California State Senate (Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Kleinberg
Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (opposing Chapter 700 and provisions for a pre-trial
determination of mental retardation); John Burton, President pro Tempore, California State Senate, Statement to
the Assembly Committee on Public Safety (July 2, 2003) [hereinafter Burton Statement] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating that a pre-trial determination of mental retardation is essential to fairness);
Letter from Paul Gerowitz, Executive Director, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, to John Burton,
President pro Tempore, California State Senate (Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Gerowitz Letter] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (supporting Chapter 700's provision for a pre-trial jury determination of mental
retardation based on cost savings and arguing the importance of proceedings that are unbiased by the "horrific
nature" of the capital case, which necessarily must occur prior to trial).
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determination.63 The pre-trial procedure is also aimed at avoiding the extraordinary
expenses associated with a capital trial if the defendant is determined to be mentally
retarded and, therefore, ineligible to be executed.64 Opponents counter that it is
unlikely that any significant savings will result from procedures that determine
mental retardation prior to trial.65 They also argue that the mental retardation
determination should be handled in the same manner as proceedings on the
defendant's sanity-at the conclusion of the trial on guilt.
66
However, a pre-trial determination is consistent with the majority of states that
enacted laws prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons,67 upon which
the Court in Atkins relied in concluding that a national consensus had developed
against such executions.68 Furthermore, the Court based its "independent evaluation"
of the issue in part on the special risk of wrongful execution that mentally retarded
defendants face in the aggregate.69 The Court stated its concerns as follows:
The risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty," [citation omitted] is enhanced, not
only by the possibility of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability
of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation in the face of... one or more aggravating factors. Mentally
retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to
their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may
create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.70
63. Burton Statement, supra note 62.
64. See Gerowitz Letter, supra note 62.
Because of all the preparations that are required for the adequate representation of a person
facing a guilt trial and, potentially, a second trial on sentencing, and because of the heightened
standards of representation when the death penalty is at stake, capital trials cost the taxpayers
substantially more than non-capital murder trials. Determining mental retardation prior to the
start of the capital trial will, in cases in which the defendant turns out to be mentally retarded,
save the state hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Id.
65. See Kleinberg Letter, supra note 62, at 1 (stating his belief that Chapter 700's pre-trial mental
retardation proceedings would not expedite cases in most circumstances since, even if the defendant is found to
be mentally retarded, there will still be proceedings "to try the defendant for murder, conduct any necessary
sanity proceedings, and determine whether special circumstances exist" to impose a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole).
66. See LaBahn Letter, supra note 57, at 2 (stating that insanity, not incompetence to stand trial, is the
most logical parallel to mental retardation).
67. Ellis, supra note 30, at 12.
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).
69. Id. at 321.
70. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)) (footnote omitted).
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Therefore, the Court stated, "impairments can jeopardize the reliability and
fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants."7' Thus,
before such proceedings begin, Chapter 700 permits a pre-trial determination that
the defendant is not mentally retarded.
2
Chapter 700 places on the defendant both the burden of producing evidence
of mental retardation73 and the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence." Chapter 700 also provides that the decision may be made by the court,
sitting without a jury." It is generally recognized that the burden of production is
appropriately placed on the defendant, and that the prosecution should not be
required to prove that the defendant is not mentally retarded. 6 The fact that
Chapter 700 imposes on the defendant the burden of proving mental retardation
by a preponderance of the evidence-rather than by the elevated burdens of
"clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt"-will likely
protect it from a constitutional challenge on that basis. However, in a decision
announced just four days after Atkins, the Court in Ring v. Arizona held that any
element of an offense, or its "functional equivalent," that could result in the
imposition of the death penalty must be decided by a jury and proven by the state
beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 In Ring, the Court struck down a statute that
permitted a defendant convicted in a jury trial to be sentenced to death after
further findings are made by the judge in a separate sentencing hearing.79 Since
the question of whether a defendant is mentally retarded is arguably a question of
fact that, if proven, could affect whether the punishment of death can be
rendered, there is the possibility that Ring could apply.80 Chapter 700 does allow
a judge to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded, but only at the
71. Id. at 306-07.
72. See supra Part III and accompanying text (describing the provisions of Chapter 700 that permit the
defendant to request a pre-trial determination of mental retardation).
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 700).
74. Id. § 1376(b)(3).
75. Id. § 1376(b)(1).
76. See Ellis, supra note 30, at 14 & n.48 (quoting BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, I
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 22-23 (15th ed. 1997)) (stating that the burden of raising the issue of mental
retardation clearly should rest with the defense and noting factors such as "whether the pertinent facts [are]
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.... more readily accessible,. . . and whether, [as here,] the
proof of a negative was required").
77. See id. at 14-15 (suggesting that since the prohibition on executing the mentally retarded is derived
from a constitutional right, placing an elevated burden of proof on the defendant is constitutionally suspect
based on the Court's decision in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996)).
78. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 602 (stating that "[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt"); see also SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 3 at 10-
II (Feb. 11, 2003) (discussing the effect of Ring v. Arizona on capital cases in which the defendant alleges
mental retardation).
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defendant's request, which constitutes a waiver of a jury hearing."' However,
since the defendant bears the burden of proving mental retardation by a
preponderance of the evidence, the new law could violate the requirement that it
be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.8
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 700 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's holding in
Atkins v. Virginia that executions of mentally retarded persons is cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment." While Chapter 700
responds to the Atkins decision by defining mental retardation and establishing
procedures for making that determination, there remain questions about whether
the definition will allow courts to adequately distinguish a defendant's meritorious
claim of retardation from those defendants whose mental condition does not merit
the protections of Atkins. 4 However, it is unlikely that the definition of mental
retardation provided for in Chapter 700 will allow defendants who are not mentally
impaired to escape execution.85 The procedures established in the new law will
likely protect mentally retarded defendants from wrongful execution, while
possibly also avoiding the expense of capital trials where the defendant is found
to be mentally retarded s6 However, these procedures may be subject to future
constitutional challenge. 7
Unlike prior legislative attempts to prohibit the execution of the mentally
retarded, Chapter 700 does not specifically provide for post-conviction procedures
for determining whether a person awaiting execution is mentally retarded 8
Appellate courts are left to resolve these cases through existing habeas corpus
procedures, but the courts can now look to Chapter 700's definition of mental
retardation in deciding those cases.
While Chapter 700 will undoubtedly prevent the execution of those
defendants who meet the required criteria for mental retardation, those who are
perhaps equally mentally impaired by, for example, brain damage as an adult or
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder will continue to face California's execution
chamber should they be convicted of a capital offense. s9 Some have suggested that
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 700).
82. See Gerowitz Letter, supra note 62 (arguing that the Ring decision imposes on the prosecution the
burden of proving the defendant is not mentally retarded).
83. Supra Part II.A.
84. Supra Part I.
85. Sup ra Part IV.
86. Supra Part IV.
87. Supra Part IV.
88. See, e.g., AB 557 (2001) (as amended on Aug. 12, 2002, but not enacted) (providing that "persons
under sentence of death at the time [the statute] take[s] effect" may raise claims of mental retardation through a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
89. See Talbot, supra note 1 (discussing those with mental impairments not covered by Atkins).
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future courts will have to consider whether these equally disabling mental
conditions deserve the protections afforded by Atkins.90 Until then, Chapter 700
allows courts in California to now uniformly apply Atkins to protect those who
are "too dumb to die."9'
90. Id.
91. Id.
